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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by virtue of § 78-2a-3(2)(j), U.C.A. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, 
STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE 
1. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in denying Ronald's petition to modify when 
it concluded that Ronald's forced retirement in 1997, and the commencement of Social 
Security benefits for both parties in 1997, were foreseeable events in 1987. 
Standard of Review: This issue is a mixed question of fact and law and is 
reviewed in part for correctness, in part for an abuse of discretion, and under a clearly 
erroneous standard. See State of Utah v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); Wells v. 
Wells, 871 P.2d 1036 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Moore v. Moore, 872 P.2d 1054 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994); Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 123 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved when the Appellant timely filed 
on February 12, 1999, his Notice of Appeal in the trial court. 
2. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in finding no substantial change in 
circumstances that was not contemplated at the time the Decree was entered, despite the 
fact that the Appellant's income had decreased by 48% from the time the Decree was 
entered. 
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Standard of Review: This issue is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Wells v. 
Wells, 871 P.2d 1036 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved when the Appellant timely filed 
on February 12, 1999, his Notice of Appeal in the trial court. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, § 30-3-5(7)(g)(i): 
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and 
new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in 
circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. The Petitioner/Appellee, Frances R. Bolliger ("Frances"), is a resident of Arizona; 
the Respondent/Appellant, Ronald E. Bolliger ("Ronald") is a temporary resident of 
Nevada. (R. 111.) 
2. Frances will be 64 years of age on September 5, 1999; Ronald became 64 years of 
age on January 23, 1999. (R. 111.) 
3. Frances and Ronald were married approximately 34 years prior to their divorce in 
1987; they have three adult children of issue from their marriage, all of whom live in the 
Phoenix, Arizona area where Frances resides. (R. 112.) 
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4. Frances has remained unmarried since her divorce from Ronald; Ronald remarried 
in April 1989 and today remains married to the same person. (R. 112.) 
5. Frances has two basic sources of income: (a) Social Security Benefits in the 
amount of $521 per month and (b) alimony from Ronald in the approximate amount of 
$1,869 per month, for a total of $2,390 per month. (R. 112.) The alimony amount of 
$1,869 is further derived from two sources: (1) half of the Respondent's Air Force 
Retirement in the amount of $1,184 per month and a set amoimt paid directly by Ronald 
of $685 per month, both set by a decree of divorce entered on March 3, 1987. (R. 112.) 
6. In addition, Frances claims that the premium for the Air Force Survivor's Benefit 
Plan, in an amount that is approximately $160 per month, should be paid by Ronald 
without any deduction for such amount from the monthly alimony payment of $685. 
(R. 112.) Ronald believes the decree provides that such premium, which varies from time 
to time, is included in and a part of the $685 alimony payment. (R. 112.) 
7. Ronald has three basic sources of income: (a) Social Security Benefits in the 
amount of $1,071; (b) half of his Air Force Retirement in the amount of $1,184 per 
month (the same as received by Frances); and (c) pension payments from L3 
Commimications in the amoimt of $682 per month, for a total of $2,937 per month, prior 
to making payments to Frances in the amount of $685 per month. (R. 112-13.) After 
paying Frances and paying $160 per month to maintain her survivor's insurance, Ronald 
is left with only $2,092 per month, or, $298 per month kss than Frances. (R. 112-13.) 
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8. At the time the Decree of Divorce was entered by this Court, Ronald was earning 
approximately $5,700 per month from his Air Force Retirement and from employment at 
Sperry (formerly Sperry Rand, later acquired by Lockheed Martin, and later changed to 
L3 Communications). (R. 113.) Ronald's monthly income today is $2.763 less than it 
was at the time the Decree was entered, or 48% less. (R. 113.) 
9. Ronald's Adjusted Gross Income ("AGI") in 1996 was $90,040; his AGI in 1997 
was $58,286 (a transition year to retirement); and his expected AGI for 1998 is $28,764 
based on current income. (R. 113.) Ronald's income today has decreased by 68% from 
1996 and by 50% from 1997. (R. 113.) 
10. Ronald was employed full-time from 1984 to March 1997 until he was forced to 
accept early retirement through a reduction in force from L3 Communications. (R. 113.) 
After his retirement from the Air Force and during his employment at L3 
Communications, Ronald qualified for and has earned a pension from L3 
Communications in the amount of $682 per month. (R. 113.) 
11. Frances ceased employment in or about June 1991, and has not been gainfully 
employed since that time. (R. 113.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court erred by concluding that it was foreseeable in 1987 that Ronald 
would be forced to retire early and that he and Frances would begin receiving Social 
Security Benefits in 1997. The trial court, however, offered no reasoning as to how the 
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parties could have foreseen that Ronald would be forced to retire at age 62 and also 
foreseen the definite amounts that each would receive in Social Security Benefits. 
The Code provides for modification of a divorce decree to allow for unforeseen 
events such as the unexpected termination of Ronald's employment. Although retirement 
in a general sense was foreseeable, the timing and the financial details were not 
foreseeable with any degree of certainty in 1987. Therefore, the parties rightfully could 
rely on the protection afforded them by the Code to modify the Decree when and if there 
became a substantial, material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time. 
Ronald's forced retirement was not foreseeable and there is no evidence in the record 
to the contrary. The trial court merely concluded that in 1987, Ronald should have 
foreseen that he could be forced to retire at the age of 62, that Frances would elect to 
begin receiving Social Security Benefits at the age of 62, and that his aggregate income 
would decline by 48%. Such a conclusion is without basis in fact or law or logic. 
II. The changes in incomes of the parties is a substantial and material change that 
justifies a reduction in alimony payments to Frances by an amount at least equal to the 
amount of her Social Security Benefits. Ronald's income has declined by 48%. At the 
same time, Frances's income has increased due to her Social Security Benefits. It is 
appropriate therefore that Ronald's alimony burden be reduced by the amount of Social 
Security Benefits being received by Frances. 
Frances has not shown any need for additional income, while Ronald has shown that 
his income has declined substantially. Unfortunately, the trial court failed to make any 
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findings of fact or law concerning the needs and financial condition of Frances. There 
certainly was no finding that she is in need of the sudden windfall resulting from Social 
Security Benefits. 
The trial court predicated its conclusion that Ronald's decrease in income was or 
should have been a foreseeable event in 1987, although there is no evidence to support 
such a conclusion. The Decree is silent on the matter and no extrinsic evidence has been 
produced to show that any retirement issues were considered in 1987, the year of the 
subject Decree. 
ARGUMENT 
In 1997. Ronald's income decreased substantially because he was forced to retire 
early and at the same time Frances began receiving Social Security Benefits: 
such changes (1) were not foreseeable in 1987: and (2) are substantial and 
material changes that justify a reduction in alimony payments to Frances. 
Ronald filed a petition to modify the Decree that was entered in 1987. His petition 
sought to only reduce, not eliminate, alimony payments to Frances in an amount equal to 
the Social Security Benefits being received by Frances. (R. 044.) Ronald's request to 
modify the Decree is governed by Utah's Code, § 30-3-5(7)(g)(i): 
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and 
new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in 
circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce. 
§ 30-3-5(7)(g)(i), U.C.A. (emphasis added). 
The alimony established in 1987 "must be readily susceptible to alteration at a later 
date." See Bridenbaugh v. Bridenbaugh, 786 P.2d 241, 242 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) {citing 
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Haslam v. Haslam, 657 P.2d 757, 758 (Utah 1982)). The basis for modifying alimony 
payments is to serve its fundamental purpose, which is 
"to enable the receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the 
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage and to prevent the spouse 
from becoming a public charge." See id 
To prevail on his petition to modify, Ronald must establish that a "substantial change 
of circumstances has occurred which justifies modification." See Bridenbaugh, 786 P.2d 
241 at 242 {citing Paffel v. Pqjffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986)). A substantial change 
in income by one of the parties may be sufficient to establish a substantial change in 
circumstances. Also, where one party begins to receive Social Security benefits or other 
retirement benefits, a substantial change in circumstances may exist. See Munns v. 
Murms, 790 P.2d 116, 123 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
A. Ronald's forced retirement in 1997 was not foreseeable in 1987, 
The Decree is void of any mention or reference of retirement benefits for either 
party. See (R. 037-41.) It is also void any consideration of Ronald's retirement, whether 
voluntary or involuntary. See id. There is nothing in the Decree or the record to indicate 
that Social Security Benefits were estimated or considered for either party. See id. 
Despite a substantial change in the relative incomes between the parties, (R. 111-13.), the 
trial court found no substantial change in circumstances, (R. 256.); (R. 269 at 4.); 
Addendum at 4, for 
"a man who is 62 years of age [and] who reached the age when he had 
the option to retire." (R. 269 at 6.); Addendum at 6 (emphasis added). 
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Although Ronald continued working and enjoying an every increasing salary, he was 
forced to retire early at the age of 62. (R. 113.) The record contains no suggestion that 
Ronald's forced retirement was even remotely contemplated in 1987. Further, it is 
unreasonable to suggest that such event should have been contemplated at the time the 
Decree was entered. If the Court were to impose a duty on all divorcing parties to draft 
stipulations and decrees that cover every possible contingency, the legal costs for 
divorcing parties would be even more burdensome that it is now. 
Moreover, the Code itself expressly contemplates that decrees are subject to 
modification. See § 30-3-5(7)(g)(i), U.C.A. Such allowance for modification cannot 
logically impose a strict duty on the parties to plan for or consider every contingency that 
otherwise attends normal contract law. Rather, Decrees are governed by statute and are 
expressly subject to modification. The only qualification the law imposes is that there be 
"a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the 
divorce." See § 30-3-5(7)(g)(i), U.C.A. The statute empowers this Court to determine 
whether Ronald's forced retirement in 1997 was foreseeable in 1987, the year the Decree 
was entered. 
It is interesting and of some importance to note that the statute, § 30-3-5(7)(g)(i), 
U.C.A., does not use the word "reasonably" to modify or limit "foreseeable" as is most 
often the case in negligence cases. Accordingly, the statute only requires a change in 
circumstances which is "not foreseeable" rather than "not reasonably foreseeable." In the 
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instant case, there is not a scintilla of evidence that Ronald's forced retirement in 1997 
was foreseeable or reasonably foreseeable in 1987. 
The trial court appears to have based its conclusion that Ronald's forced retirement 
was foreseeable on the fact that Ronald was 62 years of age and "he had the option to 
retire." See (R. 269 at 6.); Addendum at 6. The trial court did acknowledge, however, 
that had Ronald lost his job the day after his divorce, "that probably would have been a 
change of circumstances. But not at 62." (R. 269 at 5.); Addendum at 5. In effect, the 
trial court seems to conclude that an event occurring the day after the entry of the Decree 
is less foreseeable than an event that occurs 10 years later. Such reasoning seems 
illogical and bizarre. 
Under the trial court's reasoning, Ronald's forced retirement, standing alone, may 
likely be a change of circumstances. However, since Ronald could have optionally taken 
early retirement, then according to the trial court, it is not a change of circumstances.1 
That is, it appears that the trial court would not and does not consider that forced 
retirement is equivalent to an employee losing a job, if the fired employee could have 
optionally taken early retirement or found comparable employment. Such reasoning is 
faulty and does not take into account the difficulty of finding comparable employment at 
the age of 62. 
1
 The trial court loosely interchanges and perhaps confuses the distinction 
between "change in circumstances" and "foreseeable" Or, in the alternative, the trial court 
merely omits the qualifying term "foreseeable" in each instance where it states the 
necessity of being a "change in circumstances." 
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For example, assume Ronald had been fired at the age of 58 and that he found other 
employment, although at substantially less compensation than previously enjoyed by him. 
The trial court's reasoning would then lead it to conclude that such a forced change in 
employment was a foreseeable change of circumstances because Ronald could have opted 
to terminate his own employment. The trial court also makes no allowance for a change 
in compensation if such change occurs at age 62 or later, regardless of the substantiality 
of the change in compensation. 
Had Ronald not been forced to retire at age 62, he could have continued working 
until age 70 or beyond, health permitting. His annual compensation was approximately 
$90,000 in 1996. (R. 113.) Eight more years at that income level would have made an 
enormous difference in his savings compared to his Social Security Benefits of $1,071 
per month, or $12,852 annually. (R. 112.) 
Before taxes and any further increases in salary, Ronald's income during those eight 
years could easily have been more than $617,0002 greater than he is now realizing from 
his forced retirement. Assuming a tax rate of 35%, his after-tax income could be more 
than $400,000 greater than under the present circumstances. At a modest annual interest 
rate of 5%, that potential increase could yield more than $1,600 per month; a rather tidy 
sum when compared with $685 Ronald is now required to pay to Frances, in addition to 
the $1,184 she receives from his Air Force Retirement. 
2
 Taking Ronald's annual income at $90,000 less his Social Security of $12,852 
and multiplying that incremental difference by 8 years yields $617,184. 
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The trial court concluded that since the Decree is silent on the effects of retirement 
by either party, the parties must have or should have considered such effects in 1987. 
The trial court concludes that the effects of retirement, positive for Frances and negative 
for Ronald, were foreseeable in 1987 by the parties. Ronald urges this Court to find that 
his forced retirement in 1997 was not foreseeable in 1987, nor should it have been 
foreseeable. 
Finally, the parties could not, in 1987, have reasonably forecasted with any degree of 
accuracy or certainty their respective benefits under Social Security. The parties have no 
control over Congress or the Social Security Administration. Without retaining an expert, 
the parties were not in a position in 1987 to reasonably estimate the effects of Social 
Security Benefits ten years later. See Munns, 790 P.2d 116 at 123 (the court may modify 
the alimony award at such time as the actual amounts of Social Security Benefits become 
definite). Furthermore, neither party contemplated taking early retirement or seeking 
Social Security Benefits at age 62. The parties must apply for Social Security Benefits; 
nothing is automatic nor guaranteed. 
It is also reasonable and logical for the parties to rely on § 30-3-5(7)(g)(i), U.C.A. 
Since the statute permits modification of a decree if there is a substantial change in 
circumstances, the parties could legitimately rely in 1987 on their right to petition the 
court for a modification of the terms of the Decree. They were not obligated in 1987 to 
accept the terms of the Decree as being eternal when the statute provides otherwise. It is 
simply logical, reasonable, and likely that the parties considered their retirement years but 
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did not believe it necessary or wise to incorporate anything definitive into the Decree. 
Rather, they could rely on the law to protect them. 
Since they could not have determined the amount and timing of their respective 
benefits with any reasonable certainty, they could have only added general language to 
the Decree that would provide for a modification of alimony payments. Such language, 
however, would simply paraphrase or duplicate the statutory language of 
§30-3-5(7)(g)(i),aCA 
The result of the trial court's ruling vitiates § 30-3-5(7)(g)(i), £/.C.A, by forcing an 
unreasonable standard of what is foreseeable. This Court should, therefore, clarify that a 
person's forced retirement ten years later is not foreseeable as a matter of law, or, that the 
facts in this case clearly do not support any conclusion that Ronald's forced retirement 
was foreseeable in 1987. Moreover, the uncertainty surrounding the amounts and timing 
of Social Security Benefits some 10 years in the future makes it highly unlikely that such 
events should be considered foreseeable. 
B. Ronald's decrease in income and Frances' increase in income, especially 
relative to each other, represents a substantial change that justifies a 
reduction in alimony payments to FranceSt 
Depending on how the change in Ronald's income is measured, the decrease in 
Ronald's gross income, subsequent to his forced retirement, ranges from 30% to 49%. 
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For example, in 1987, Ronald's income was $70,181, or $5,848 per month.3 (R. 113.) 
Ronald's 1998 monthly gross income is comprised of three retirement sources: Social 
Security of $1,071 + Air Force Retirement of $2,368 + L3 Communications of $682, for a 
monthly total of $4,121. (R. 112.) Compared with his 1987 monthly income of $5,848, 
Ronald's current gross income is 30% less. 
However, the above analysis does not reflect the effects of inflation. At a 3% rate of 
inflation for 11 years, $5,848 would be $8,095 in current dollars. Using the 1987 
income, adjusted for inflation, Ronald's current income of $4,121 is 49% less than it was 
in 1987. At a 2% rate of inflation, $5,848 would be $7,272 in current dollars. Based on 
a 2% rate of inflation, Ronald's current income of $4,121 is 43% less than his 1987 
income adjusted for inflation. 
Using the same methodology for Frances, the amount of change in her income is 
significantly less than, the change in Ronald's income when calculating her current 
income. In 1987, the Petitioner's monthly income was $835 from the Air Force 
Retirement + $685 from Ronald, for a total of $1,520. In 1998, her monthly income is 
$521 from Social Security + $1,184 from the Air Force Retirement + $685 in alimony 
from Ronald, for a total monthly income of $2,390. This represents a gain of 57% over 
her 1987 income. Adjusting for inflation, $1,520 would be $1,890 in current dollars at a 
3
 The Stipulation by the parties estimated Ronald's income at $5,700 per month. 
(R. 113.) However, upon obtaining a copy of Ronald's tax return, it was discovered to be 
slightly higher. (R. 148.) 
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2% inflation rate and $2,104 in current dollars at a 3% inflation rate. The decrease in 
income is therefore 26% at 2% inflation and 14% at 3% inflation. 
The above analyses are summarized for the Court's convenience in Table 1 below. 
Table 1 also shows the dollar differences between the 1987 and 1998 gross incomes. 
TABLE 1 
No Inflation 
2% Inflation 
[ 3% Inflation 
Change in Gross Monthly Income From 1987 
Prior to Payments to Frances 
Frances 
+ 57% 
+ 26% 
+ 14% 
+$870 
+$500 
+$286 
Ronald 
- 30% 
- 43% 
- 49% 
($1,727) 
($3,151) 
($3,974) 
When comparing Ronald's change in income with the change in income for Frances, 
it is clear that Ronald has suffered far more than Frances. If Ronald continues paying 
$685 alimony to Frances, her income will be greater today than it was in 1987, even after 
adjusting for inflation at 2% or 3%. In contrast, Ronald's gross income will be less, 
regardless of inflation, than it was in 1987. In fact, Frances's current monthly income 
exceeds the net income of Ronald by $298.4 
4
 Frances's monthly income as shown above is $2,390; Ronald's net income 
after payments to and for Frances is $2,092 ($4,121 — $1,184 — $685—$160). Thus 
the Petitioner's income is $298 more than Ronald's net income. 
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Using the same methodology as above, changes in "net income" are summarized 
below in Table 2. For this purpose, "net income" differs from "gross income" only by the 
deductions for Ronald's payments to Frances plus his monthly payment of $160 to 
maintain survivor's insurance for Frances. Therefore, the column for Frances in Table 2 
is identical to her column in Table 1. Ronald's column, however, shows that his 
percentage decrease in net income is far worse, being 48% without adjusting for inflation 
and 62% adjusted for 3% inflation. 
TABLE 2 
No Inflation 
2% Inflation 
3% Inflation 
Change in Net Monthly Income From 1987 
After AH Payments to Frances 
Frances 
+ 57% 
+ 26% 
+ 14% 
+$870 
+$500 
+$286 
Ronald 
- 48% 
- 58% 
- 62% 
($2,076) 
($3,129) 
($3,738) | 
Using the same methodology, Ronald's and Frances's net income can be calculated 
assuming that Ronald's alimony obligation of $685 is terminated. These data are 
summarized below in Table 3. Since the elimination of the $685 alimony payment affects 
both Frances and Ronald, the columns for each are different in Table 3 than those found 
in Tables 1 and 2 above. 
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TABLE 3 
No Inflation 
2% Inflation 
3% Inflation 
Change in Net Monthly Income From 1987 
After All Payments to Frances 
AND Excluding $685 Payment in 1998 
Frances 
+ 12% 
- 20% 
- 28% 
+$185 
($185) 
($399) 
Ronald 
- 32% 
- 45% 
- 51% 
($1,391) 
($2,444) 
($3,053) 
By eliminating the $685 alimony payment, Table 3 shows that Ronald will not 
maintain his relative income against that of Frances. To do so would also require a 
reduction in the one-half portion of Ronald's Air Force Retirement that is being paid to 
Frances. Ronald has not heretofore suggested any reduction in the portion of his 
retirement benefits going to Frances. However, the data in the above tables show that he 
is entitled to relief from the $685 alimony payment that has so devastated him and his 
current wife of 10 years. 
It is clear from the foregoing analysis that Ronald's income has suffered substantially 
since his retirement. At the same time, Frances has improved her financial situation from 
the onset of Social Security Benefits. Maintaining the $685 alimony payment, 
perpetuates an injustice and an unintended consequence of the Decree. The Decree was 
not intended to punish Ronald and reward Frances. However, under the current financial 
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conditions of the parties, the Decree is doing just that. The Decree should be modified to 
maintain the living standards enjoyed by both parties during the marriage. 
Further, the $682 per month that Ronald receives from L3 Communications as 
retirement income is only possible because Ronald chose to continue working for 11 
years following the parties1 divorce. Ronald's work ethic is now working to his 
disadvantage. Such a result is counter to public policy that encourages industry, a work 
ethic, and self-reliance. 
If Ronald had not worked for the past 11 years, he would not be entitled to the $682 
per month and his lower income would tip the scale farther toward a reduction or 
elimination of alimony. In other words, if Ronald were not receiving $682 from L3 
Communications, he clearly would not be able to pay $685 in alimony to Frances. In that 
case, the $685 in alimony would of necessity be terminated, and he would, in effect, be 
rewarded for not working during those 11 years. On the othei hand, since Frances chose 
not to work for those same 11 years, Ronald should not be punished by taking his $682 in 
retirement from L3 and transferring it in the form of alimony to Frances. If this were so, 
it would turn public policy on its head. 
From the above, it is clear that a substantial change exists with respect to Ronald's 
income and with respect to the relative incomes between the parties. There is no 
justification for Frances to keep as a windfall her Social Security Benefits while Ronald's 
income has been cut by 48% due to forced retirement. 
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C. The trial court made no findings on the financial condition and ability to 
earn or pay by the parties: the three factors set forth in Bridenbaugh. 
The Court in Bridenbaugh, articulated the purpose of alimony: 
"The fundamental purpose of alimony 'is to enable the receiving spouse 
to maintain as nearly as possible the standard of living enjoyed during 
the marriage and to prevent the spouse from becoming a public 
charge/" 
Bridenbaugh, 786 P.2d at 242 (citing Paffel, 732 P.2d at 100). 
The Bridenbaugh Court also reaffirmed the three factors to be considered in 
adjusting alimony payments: 
1. The financial condition and needs of the spouse claiming support; 
2. The ability of that spouse to provide sufficient income for herself; and 
3. The ability of the responding spouse to provide the support. 
See id. at 242. 
Even though a responding spouse may have the economic ability to provide support, 
if the other two factors do not establish that the receiving spouse needs support to 
maintain her living standard enjoyed during the marriage, the courts have reduced or 
terminated alimony. See Bridenbaugh, 786 P.2d 241 at 243 (where former husband's 
income was $240,000 per year to support his family of four and where he had a net worth 
of approximately $2,500,000, termination of alimony was appropriate where the receiving 
spouse's income was only $22,000 per year to support herself only). 
The only sources of data to analyze the "needs" of the parties are found in the 
financial declarations filed by the parties. (R. 087-95, 098-103.) The two essential 
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categories of needs are "monthly payments" for debts and "monthly expenses." See id 
The monthly payments for each category and for each party are summarized in Table 4 
below, including an "adjusted income" line that reflects Ronald's payment for his mobile 
home where he and his present wife reside and which is comparable to Frances's rent:5 
TABLE 4 
Monthly Payments on Debts 
Monthly Expenses 
Monthly Income ($685 Alimony Eliminated) 
Monthly Expenses as % of Income 
Adjusted Monthly Expenses (Mobile Home) 
Adjusted Monthly Expenses as % of Income 
Total Payments and Expenses 
[Total Payments and Expenses as % of Income 
Petitioner 
$550 
$2,303 
$1,705 
135% 
$2,303 
135% 
$2,853 
167% 
Respondent 
$1,693 
$3,218 
$2,937 
110% 1 
$3,701 1 
126% | 
$4,911 1 
167% | 
Table 4 shows that by reducing the amount of support payments to Frances from 
$1,869 per month to $1,184, the percent of each parties' monthly payments and expenses 
is identical, at 167%.6 The percentages in the last line of the Table 2 also show that the 
income of each party is less than her or his monthly outflows; signaling an obvious 
5
 Ronald remarried in 1987, and he now lives with his wife in a mobile home. 
They do not own any real estate. Ronald's residence, therefore, is his mobile home and 
the payments on it are equivalent to mortgage payments or rent. 
6
 It is coincidental that 167% was the result for each party. 
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problem for each party. However, they each have essentially the same level of difficulty 
in meeting monthly payments for debt and living expenses. Even if the parties' debts are 
excluded and only their adjusted monthly expenses are considered, the parties are fairly 
comparable at 137% for Frances and 126% for Ronald. 
If the analysis contained in Table 4 is repeated with the $685 alimony payment in 
place, the parties' percentages of payments and expenses of adjusted monthly income are 
119% and 218%, respectively. This shows that Ronald does not have the ability to 
provide $685 in alimony to Frances. Thus, the third Bridenbaugh factor tips in favor of 
eliminating the $685 alimony payment. The second Bridenbaugh factor is neutral or tips 
in Ronald's favor, since Frances's income has actually increased since 1987, and she has 
been able to support herself without becoming a ward of the state. 
CONCLUSION 
Ronald's forced retirement in 1997 was clearly not foreseeable in 1987. Even if the 
possibility was contemplated, the parties had no duty to incorporate language in the 
Decree that would only duplicate the essence of § 30-3-5(7)(g)(i), U.C.A., since the 
statute itself provides for modification. Further, Ronald's income today is substantially 
less than it was in 1987, while Frances's income is greater. If Ronald's obligation for 
alimony is not reduced, the net effect will be to penalize him for working for 10 years in 
order to become eligible for a pension that is roughly equal to the amount he is directly 
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paying to Frances. In other words, the benefits of Ronald's work ethic are transferred to 
Frances, who chose not to work after 1990. 
This Court should restore equity to these parties. By eliminating the $685 Ronald 
now pays monthly to Frances, Frances' income remains essentially the same as it was 
prior to receiving her Social Security Benefits. Equally fair, by eliminating the $685 
Ronald now pays monthly to Frances, Ronald's income will still be substantially less than 
he has enjoyed from the fruits of his labors during the ten years following his divorce 
from Frances. 
Ronald, therefore, requests this Court to order a modification of the Decree by 
eliminating the $685 alimony payment now required of Ronald or at least reducing the 
alimony by the amount of Social Security Benefits being received by Frances. In the 
alternative, Ronald requests this Court to reverse the trial court's ruling that Ronald's 
forced retirement was foreseeable and remand for a determination of the change in 
alimony that is appropriate based on the financial conditions and needs of the parties. 
Ronald further requests this Court to reverse the award of attorney's fees by the trial 
court and to award him his attorney's fees at the trial court. Ronald also requests this 
Court to award him his attorney's fees on this appeal. 
DATED this 19th day of August 1999. 
Michael A. Jensen / J 
Attorney for RonalcHE^Bolliger, Respondent/Appellant 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM VIDEO TAPE) 
THE COURT: Good morning. Ready on 
Bolliger versus Bolliger? 
MS. MARELIUS: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. I read all the 
submissions and I've pretty well made my mind up, but 
I'll hear anything that you want to argue. 
I'm serious, Mr. Jensen. This is only 
going to end one way, but I'm also happy to let you 
proffer anything you want, or argue the law any way 
you want. 
MR. JENSEN: Wonder if we're wasting our 
time . 
THE COURT: I think you are. 
MR. JENSEN: Court's time. 
THE COURT: Your client can't win. He has 
got no change in circumstances, and the plain 
language of the divorce decree says he can't deduct 
that insurance premium. That's part of the total 
that he paid. And I would award attorney fees to 
Mrs. Bolliger. 
MR. JENSEN: Your Honor, there's no change 
of circumstances? 
4 
THE COURT: The change in circumstances, in 
order to warrant modifying decree of divorce, has to 
be something not contemplated at the time of the 
entry of the decree. 
Clearly retirement is always contemplated 
when people get to be the age of 63. That can't be a 
change by itself. If anybody has had a substantial 
change in circumstances it's the petitioner because 
of THE changes in her health situation. I'm not 
going to make a change based on that either. 
MR. JENSEN: If I may, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. JENSEN: Two things. There's case law 
that suggests that the introduction of social 
security by either party is the grounds for a change 
of circumstances. 
THE COURT: Well, then the case law is 
wrong and I'm sure it wouldn't be consistent 
throughout. Everybody who's worked the requisite 
number of quarters is going to qualify for social 
security. So that also can't be something that was 
beyond the contemplation of the parties in this case 
who did this to themselves, because it was a 
stipulated divorce. 
He knew she would retire. She knew he 
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would retire. They both knew that they would be 
getting social security and they both knew that they 
would be sharing retirement proceeds. 
MR. JENSEN: I suggest, your Honor, that --
two things. One is that the -- in this case the 
respondent was put into early retirement through the 
force reduction that was not anticipated. Basically 
he lost his job. And at age 62, he did not 
anticipate losing his job at age 62. He fully 
anticipated continuing to work. That's a forced 
reduction. That's not an anticipated circumstance, 
your Honor. It wasn't contemplated in any way. 
Suppose he lost his job the day after the 
divorce? 
THE COURT: That probably would have been a 
change of circumstances. But not at 62. 
MR. JENSEN: There was no contemplation 
that the man would retire, your Honor. There is no 
mention of it whatsoever in the decree. There can't 
be, and the contemplation of something that is not 
even mentioned, your Honor, age 62 when he was let go 
and his work. He was making at that time $90,000 a 
year. He could have earned substantially more for 
his retirement and savings over the next few years. 
There was no mandatory retirement contemplated. 
6 
There was no contemplation of an early firing, you 
know, or termination. 
THE COURT: Reduction in force. 
MR. JENSEN: Yeah. There can't be -- so 
that's stipulated, your Honor, so that can't be --
that's stipulated now. 
THE COURT: It's not a substantial change 
in circumstances for a man who is 62 years of age who 
reached the age when he had the option to retire, 
anyway. Plus he's still got the option of finding 
another job and going forward. Doesn't have to, but 
that's certainly a legitimate option for him. 
MR. JENSEN: And --(inaudible) -- there was 
no contemplation of the amount of social security by 
either side. So at that the point in time there was 
no estimate made, there was no discussion about what 
it might be. And so the total dollars on either side 
certainly wasn't waived in determining what their 
alimony had to be forever. Certainly there's --
(inaudible). 
THE COURT: Your client stipulated that the 
alimony would be forever. I think this is very 
clearly a case where now that he has reached age 63 
and life isn't exactly the way he hoped it would be 
that he realizes he made a bad bargain. And he may 
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have made an unfair bargain, but we don't have a 
substantial change of circumstances sufficient to 
warrant modifying the decree. 
MR. JENSEN: (Inaudible) -- think the other 
case law in here is perfectly clear. 
THE COURT: I think this case is absolutely 
clear, Mr. Jensen. I don't think it's a close call 
by a mile. 
MR. JENSEN: The case law suggests 
that --(inaudible)-- alimony can change, depending on 
the circumstances. 
THE COURT: That's right. And I'm finding, 
based on the stipulated facts submitted to me, that 
there has not been a factual change sufficient to 
meet the standard the court requires, which is a 
substantial material change of circumstances not 
contemplated at the time of entry of the decree. 
Parties are on a track that should have been 
anticipated, should have been discussed. I don't 
know what they talked about with their lawyers. 
Ms. Marelius was there, but none of the rest of us 
was there back then. 
This is not a case for a modification of 
divorce decree. 
As a matter of fact, where the parties are 
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right now is not unfair. Even if you could show 
me 
MR. JENSEN: Even if she's making more 
money now than he is? 
THE COURT: What? Fifty dollars? 
MR. JENSEN: Beg your pardon? 
THE COURT: Fifty dollars? 
MR. JENSEN: (Inaudible.) 
THE COURT: Supporting a wife was clearly 
completely irrelevant. That's a choice he made 
subsequent to entry of the decree of divorce. If you 
wanted to get into that, I'm sure the other side 
would want to get into her earnings or her earning 
capacity, which is also not relevant. 
MR. JENSEN: I'm just saying she now makes 
$138 more than he does -- (inaudible). 
THE COURT: I don't find that to be 
significant in any way. 
If you want to look at fairness, she got 
treated unfairly from the time of the entry of the 
decree until now. Maybe it's a little more fair now, 
but, again, that's the parties' choice. She made 
that agreement the same way he made the agreement. 
MR. JENSEN: Let me ask --
THE COURT: Yeah. 
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MR. JENSEN: -- the Court, your Honor, on 
the other point about the insurance premium. 
THE COURT: Clearly intended to be an 
addition, not a deduction from. To read that 
sentence any other way is to torture it to death. 
Plus, we have an estoppel issue on that one. 
MR. JENSEN: Beg your pardon? 
THE COURT: I said we have an estoppel 
issue on that one, because of his course of conduct 
since entry of decree until very recently. He would 
have been bound by his conduct in any event. 
MS. MARELIUS: Our third issue was his 
maintenance of life insurance. There was -- when he 
was employed and had this corporate status he had 
86,000 available, and that's how much he was making. 
He now indicates that since his retirement he is not 
able to keep the veterans policy at 36,000. I think 
discovery indicated he could be making 50,000. Is 
that correct? So that was a third issue. 
MR. JENSEN: Insurance policy was 
terminated when he was terminated from employment. 
He had no ability to carry that on. 
MS. MARELIUS: I would -- and I appreciate 
that may be a change that is not under his control, 
but I think he should be mandated to make some 
10 
supplemental life insurance to cover alimony. 
THE COURT: Well, I wouldn't order him to 
maintain a policy that he can't maintain any longer. 
If this case was before me for the first time, I 
don't ever order anybody to buy life insurance to 
cover alimony. Alimony terminates, by operation of 
law, upon the death of one of the parties, unless 
they stipulate otherwise. But they did stipulate in 
this case that he would continue to maintain payments 
on life insurance. That's correct, isn't it? 
MS. MARELIUS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Well, I don't see any change 
warranting a change in that except that I'm not going 
to order him to maintain a policy he can't maintain 
anymore. 
MS. MARELIUS: Okay. 
THE COURT: She's entitled to fees and 
costs, and I'm not going to find contempt. I think, 
however misguided, it was not a bad-faith effort to 
change. He should not have unilaterally have stopped 
making payments. She's entitled to a judgment plus 
interest. I'm not going to make a contempt finding. 
Anything I missed? 
MS. MARELIUS: I will submit an affidavit 
of costs and fees. 
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THE COURT: Thank you. 
MS. MARELIUS: I will be glad to do that 
THE COURT: All right. 
MS. MARELIUS: Thank you, your Honor. 
(Proceedings in the 
above-entit led matter were 
concluded.) 
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